Incomplete information about connectivity and functionality of elements of networked control systems is a challenging issue in applying model-based security analysis in practice. This issue can be addressed by modelling techniques providing inherent mechanisms to describe incomplete information. We present and exemplary demonstrate a new, ontology-based method to adaptively model and analyse networked control systems from a security perspective. Our method allows modelling different parts of the system with different levels of detail. We include a formalism to handle incomplete information by applying iterative extension and iterative refinement of the model where necessary. By using machine-based reasoning on an ontology model of the system, security-relevant information is deduced. During this process, non-obvious attack vectors are identified using a structural analysis of the model and by connecting the model to vulnerability information.
INTRODUCTION
Comprehensive security analysis is a fundamental step in securing the Smart Grid. However, due to the complexity of the System Under Evaluation (sue), together with the heterogeneous nature of the Smart Grid, this analysis is a difficult and tedious task. Machine-supported analysis, based on a formal description of the system, is a possibility to cope with this complexity. Hence, recent work on machine-based reasoning like Sommestad et al. (2013) ; Ji et al. (2009) ; Ou et al. (2005) ; Zakeri et al. (2006) introduced some degree of automation to this process.
The key factor for such a model-based analysis is the accuracy and completeness of the underlying model. Achieving accuracy and completeness in practice is often the hardest part of the analysis. The security analyst has to cope with incomplete or inaccurate information about the sue. Moreover, not all parts of the system need to be modelled on the same level of detail.
Current models for ontology-based reasoning require complete information with respect to the language they define and do not allow to have different levels of detail. In contrast, in this paper we provide an ontology to model networked control systemstypical for industrial control systems and the Smart Grid -in a flexible and adaptive way. Our generic ontology language allows modelling systems on different levels of detail. We give an iterative process that allows developing a system description in an adaptive way: The basic elements in our ontology are modules and interfaces. The analyst starts with an initial system template, the initial module, and identifies the (external) interfaces of the system. Then, iteratively, interfaces and modules are expanded, hereby increasing the information about the system and the level of detail. The expansion needs not to be done evenly, that is, some parts of the system can be described more in detail than others.
This approach allows us to focus our modelling on those parts of the system that are interesting for the security analysis. Moreover, comprehensive information about the system is not always available, or is acquired subsequently after a preliminary assessment. Our approach enables such a procedure, as at any stage a security assessment can be conducted. In addition, our modular approach allows reusing already modelled parts.
In this work, we provide an ontology language specification for adaptive modelling and describe its refinement and expansion method. The approach shows its full power once the information gathering process is supported by automatic tools. Hence, we present a short outlook on how standard information security tools can be used to further automate this process. Then we demonstrate the use of the models by applying a machine-based security analysis onto it. Our machine-based reasoning allows the discovery of potential attack vectors. We further illustrate, how already known vulnerabilities documented in various sources can be incorporated and used in the security analysis.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic language elements for modelling. Further definitions are introduced later in the paper when they become relevant. Section 3 describes the iterative process of model refinement through expansion of interfaces and modules. There, we also provide an outlook on how such a process can be supported by tools. In Section 4, the machinebased deduction of implicit knowledge is addressed. The modelling of vulnerabilities and the linkage to vulnerability databases are described in Section 5. Section 6 describes the automated security analysis based on our ontology language. Related work is given in Section 7. We conclude and present an outlook for further applications of our approach in Section 8.
ADAPTIVE ONTOLOGY FOR NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS

Basic Concepts
An ontology in the formal description language OWL 2 DL is expressed in terms of 'concepts', 'roles', and 'individuals' (see Hitzler (2008) ). The membership of an individual I to a concept C is denoted by C(I). Roles are partial functions on individuals. A role r(x , y ) can be interpreted as a relation between individuals x and y , meaning x has a property r to y . We define the domain and range of roles by writing them as partial functions (r : domain → range ). If C 1 is a sub-concept of C 2 (i.e. ∀ x : C 1 (x ) → C 2 (x )), we denote this by C 1 C 2 , and analogue for sub-roles. This hierarchy of concepts is used by a semantic reasoner to infer and extend the model. The operators ≡, , and are concept equality, concept union, and concept intersection, respectively. The concept containing all individuals is denoted by while the empty concept is denoted by ⊥. For a role R and a class C, the class-expression ∃ R.C denotes the set of all individuals connected via R to another individual, which is an instance of C. Furthermore, ∀ R.C describes the class of all individuals for which all via R related individuals must be instances of C. Number restrictions (like ∃ ≥n ) are used to describe the number of individuals, related to a role. In addition, we give expressions in predicate logic. Variables in predicate logic are written as ?x .
Expressions about classes allow the machine-based reasoner to deduce implicit knowledge that is not explicitly stated. Assume for instance that a concept C 1 C 2 . Then any individual I that is in C 1 is by definition also in C 2 and therefore any statement made on the more general concept C 2 holds also for I. In particular, the operations ≡, , and allow construction of new concepts. The reasoner is also able to identify contradictions in the model. The inferring of new roles is addressed in more detail in Section 4.
Interface ≡ Sender Receiver
(1) Bidirectional ≡ Sender Receiver ListenOnly Bidirectional InitiateOnly Bidirectional ⊥ ≡ InitiateOnly ListenOnly
The following basic roles are defined for interfaces and modules:
• hasInterface : Module → Interface assigns interfaces to modules.
• connected : Sender → Receiver indicates the possibility of two interfaces to communicate (with respect to connection requiring compatibility).
• communicates : Sender → Receiver indicates that two interfaces are communicating.
• compatible : Sender → Receiver indicates that two interfaces are compatible Formally, these roles are defined by specifying the domain and the range of each role:
For the sake of brevity, we will omit such definitions for the remainder of the paper and provide only the partial function specification. communicates connected compatible
Compatibility of Interfaces
In order to illustrate the model refinement process presented in this work, we use a system as depicted in Example 2 as a running example.
Example 2 A high level model of an automation system:
Security Relations
Instances of Interface can be secured, i.e., protected against eavesdropping and manipulation. A secured Interface is member of the concept Secured.
Key material is a member of the concept Key. The following roles describe the linkage between keys and secured interfaces:
• hasKey : Module → Key denotes which modules have knowledge of a certain key.
• acceptsKey : Interface → Key denotes that an secured Interface accepts a key to access the connection.
Functional Dependencies and Access
The outputs of a module depend on the values it receives. In Example 2, if the output IO of System could result as a function based on received values on WAN, such a dependency would exist (which normally should not be the case). An attacker could then use this property to manipulate the output of a module. We capture these input/output dependencies in a generalised way by the following role:
• depends : Interface → Interface denotes a dependency between two interfaces, i.e., the input at the first interface determines in some way the output at the second interface.
However, the presented role is more general than in the example above. In particular, we can state that any interface which uses another interface (e.g. a network stack) depends on that interface:
Further, any communication implies a dependency between the communicating interfaces. Thus, communicates is a sub-role of depends:
communicates depends
In some cases interfaces allow the modification of the functionality of the associated module. This is, for example, the case for programming interfaces of Remote Terminal Units (rtus) or for remote access interfaces. Without any further specification, we assume by default the worst case that access to an interface allows (the user or an attacker) to fully control the module it belongs to. If this assumption does not apply interfaces are added to the concept NotControllable.
NotControllable Interface (6)
ITERATIVE MODULE AND INTERFACE REFINEMENT
In order to support a progressive modelling of a system, we apply a hierarchical approach. Initially, we consider the whole sue as a single module, and identify the interfaces of this module. In the final model, these are the external interfaces. Example 2 shows how such a modelling might look.
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Then, in an iterative process, interfaces and modules are expanded to generate a refined model. This approach allows a model to be more fine granular at sensitive places, and more coarse grained where only limited information is available. When the system is sufficiently modelled, a security analysis (which in our case uses additionally a vulnerability database as input) can be performed. The identification of sensitive places and the sufficiency of the modelling process is subject to security best practices and has to be part of future work. The technique also allows continuation of the model refinement process after a preliminary security analysis. The following figure shows the overall model refinement process.
Initial Template Expand Interfaces Expand Modules
Security Analysis Vulnerability Database
Attack Vectors
Expansion of Interfaces
When refining a part of the system, usually modules and interfaces are expanded. In general, it is recommended to expand interfaces prior to their providing modules. This process is described in the following steps .
Step 1: Add contained sub-interfaces The first step of expansion is to add new interfaces to the module and to relate them to the original one with an originatesFromI role.
• originatesFromI : Interface → Interface denotes that the first Interface results from an expansion of the second Interface.
• Note that the Interface WAN remains part of the knowledge base, although not depicted in the figure above.
Expanded interfaces, i.e., those for which an originatesFromI role exists, are hidden in the network view of the system but remain in the ontology. In an interface expansion step, each sub-interface is provided by the same module as the interface it originates from.
Step 
Expansion of Modules
To allow a more detailed analysis of a system, modules can be partitioned into sub-modules. The link between a module and its sub-modules is described using the originatesFromM role:
• originatesFromM : Module → Module denotes that the first module results from an expansion of the second module.
Step 1: Add contained sub-modules When expanding a module, all sub-modules are added to the knowledge base and connected with the originatesFromM role. In this step, it is important that the list of sub-modules is complete, i.e., that indeed the sum of all sub-modules constitute the module. In case there are parts that are not supposed to be modelled, a "remainder" module can be used. Expanding the module System presented in Example 3 reveals several sub-modules depicted in Example 6.
Example 6 An examination of the network plan shows that the System comprises a PC that is used for SCADA and a rtu; in addition there is a firewall (FW) and a Switch. 
Step 2: Assign external interfaces Using the hasInterface role, the original interfaces are assigned to the expanded modules. Each interface of the original module must be assigned to exactly one module in the expanded model. In Example 7 this is performed based on Example 6.
Example 7
We analyse our system and locate the TCP/IP interface at the firewall and the IO interface at the rtu. The HTTP connections are transparently routed over the firewall, thus this interface is at the PC:
Note that the assignment to the outer entity (in our example the System) remains.
Step 3: Create internal interfaces All internal interfaces are added to the model. They are attached using hasInterface to the newly created modules and added to the proper interface sub-concepts in order to provide information about compatibility of interfaces. There is no need for originatesFromX roles for these new interfaces as their origin can be determined by the modules they are attached to by hasInterface. In Example 8, internal interfaces are integrated to the model.
Example 8
The following internal interfaces are added to the model: internal Ethernet, TCP/IP, and Industrial Ethernet.
Step 4: Communication between internal interfaces Finally, the newly created interfaces are linked using the communicates role (in case the components are supposed to communicate) and the connected role (if they are connected, it is possible that they could communicate). This step is illustrated in Example 9.
Example 9 All linked interfaces communicate with their counterparts: For each pair of interfaces that are linked we add a communicates role:
communicates(ETH1 FW, ETH1 Switch)
...
Note that the connected role follows implicitly from (3).
Step 5: Add access information Similar to
Step 2 of the expansion of interfaces (see Section 3.1), it needs to be assessed if the new interfaces are in the concept NotControllable.
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Step 6: Add functional dependencies For all new interfaces not connected with a communicates role (for which the dependency role is given implicitly), the depends role needs to be examined.
Example 10
In the expanded system of Example 9, we identify that all interfaces except the IE1 RTU are in NotControllable. Further, there are functional dependencies inside the FW and the rtu, as depicted in the figure in Example 13.
Semantical information gathering
In addition to the structural expansion of modules and interfaces, we use sub-concepts to represent additional information about the module respectively interface. The purpose is twofold: first, only by specifying subtypes, can specific knowledge necessary for a non-trivial security analysis be collected. Second, the recognition and reuse of previously refined models is possible.
3.3.1. Typing of Sub-models When expanding interfaces and modules, the new individual should be added to a concept that captures as much information about the individual as possible. This is illustrated based on a PC and its operating system in the following Example 11. 
Tool-based Expansion
As stated initially, the model expansion steps can be performed manually but show their full power when combined with tools generating this information automatically. Security tools for information gathering are good candidates to provide such information. We illustrate this approach by showing how a generic TCP/IP interface of a system can be expanded into a set of interfaces that are actually present in the system:
nmap is a tool commonly used to scan a host for open ports (see Lyon (2008) TCP80Interface(IF4711TCP80)∧ originatesFromI(IF4711TCP80, IF4711)
INFERRING ABOUT MODELS
A major advantage of ontological modelling is that in addition to the explicitly gathered information, further correlations can be expressed by adding rules. These often simple rules can be evaluated by a reasoner. Even in large systems, where it would be difficult to keep track of consequences if done manually, a reasoner can evaluate queries such as consistency.
To represent this inferable knowledge, adequate rules need to be added. Some important rules are presented in this section.
Inferring connected Relations
An important issue for security analysis is to determine the interconnection of a system. Even designers are often not aware of all connections in complex systems.
A starting point when inferring further connections is that two interfaces are connected if
• they are compatible and
• the base interfaces they are using are connected and
• they are either not secured, or the key is shared.
These points are formalised by the statement below:
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Inferring communicates Relations
It is worthwhile to examine communicates roles as these represent actual communication in the sue. The addition of these roles allows, for example, to identify communication where none should occur according to the design of the system (e.g. 'airgapped' systems).
If two interfaces communicate and each uses only one base interface, then the base interfaces are communicating. This is expressed by the statement below:
If an interface uses more than one base interface, more specific rules (e.g. protocol related) can be included.
VULNERABILITY MODELLING
Vulnerabilities describe the system's behaviour (more specifically interfaces) with respect to attacks. Some assumed properties are no longer in the presence of vulnerabilities. We introduce a new concept Vulnerability for this. For example, privilege escalation vulnerabilities may provide control through interfaces despite being modelled as NotControllable.
Vulnerabilities are characterised by the kind of affected interfaces and the effects on them. In order to describe this, we introduce a new role
• isVulnerable : Interface → Vulnerability denoting that an Interface is vulnerable to a Vulnerability.
Vulnerability Classes
Attacks can either be enabled via inadequate configuration or via vulnerabilities in interfaces. We propose to consider the following three concepts of vulnerabilities:
CodeExecution An Interface modelled to be NotControllable allows a manipulation of the Module of the Interface by using this kind of vulnerability.
For example, arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities such as CVE-2014-6271 (Shellshock) For example, weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms, such as the man-in-the-middle downgrade of TLS to weak export ciphers described by Adrian et al. (2015) , are in this class.
InformationDisclosure
Confidential information modelled to be known only to the module, such as keys, is assumed to be extractable through an Interface by this kind of vulnerability.
This vulnerability class manifests often in weak passwords or exposition of secret internal states, such as improper input validation like CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed).
The following Example 12 visualises this vulnerability.
Example 12
The vulnerable interface leaks the key to the attacker. The Attacker could use the obtained hasKey to communicate to Module2 after exploiting this vulnerability.
All described Vulnerability classes are sub-concepts of Vulnerability:
CodeExecution Vulnerability CryptoIneffectiveness Vulnerability InformationDisclosure Vulnerability
SECURITY ANALYSIS
A security analysis is possible after each step of model expansion. In the beginning of the expansion process the results will be more generic and will make conservative security assumptions. In order to achieve detailed results, more information has to be added by selectively expanding the model. The results of the analysis can point to parts of the model, which may need further expansion in order to obtain more useful results. It is assumed that 70 attacks only propagate through defined properties (see (Section 6.2).
Assign Publicly Known Vulnerabilities
As an extension of the modelling it might be possible to assign known vulnerabilities. There exist many services capable of gathering and distributing information about vulnerabilities, e.g. Jajodia et al. (2011) . The information from these sources can be aggregated, converted, and put into the model to obtain a more detailed and upto-date analysis. As a basis, the modules have to be identifiable types of software or hardware such as Common Platform Enumeration (cpe). For the cpe, all known vulnerabilities and their Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (cve) can be queried from the services. These vulnerabilities can then be mapped to the affected interfaces of the modules. The vulnerabilities then have to be classified for further analysis. This can be done, for example, by mapping the Common Weakness Enumeration (cwe) contained in the cve to vulnerability classes (Martin et al. (2005) ).
Identifying Attack Vectors
The model including vulnerabilities is a directed graph. In a first step to identify attack vectors, the target (T) and the start point (A) of the attack have to be defined.
An edge from ?m to ?i if is added to the attack graph if the following condition holds:
• hasInterface(?m, ?i). This represents the fact that control of a module allows controlling the associated interfaces.
An edge from ?i to ?m is added if one of the following conditions hold:
• hasInterface(?m, ?i) ∧ ¬NotControllable (?m) . This reflects the case that the interface (potentially) allows controlling the module it belongs to.
• hasInterface(?m,
This reflects the case where the interface does not allow controlling the module by design, but is used to gain access by a code execution vulnerability.
An edge from ?i1 to ?i2 is added if one of the following conditions hold:
• connected (?i1, ?i2) . This represents the fact that access to an interface allows accessing the connected interface.
• usesInterface(?
This reflects the case where a communication is protected by an ineffective method, and circumvented by an attacker that has access to the lower level media.
• depends (?i1, ?i2) . This represents the situation where the manipulation of an interface leads to changes in a functionally dependent interface.
The single paths of the attack graph are the attack vectors. It is possible to extend this with rules for information disclosure of key material. This leads to complex attack vectors including and and or conditions, and is omitted for sake of brevity.
In Example 13, the running example is used to illustrate a security analysis.
Example 13
The extraction of one specific attack path is depicted based on an augmented Example 9. One resulting attack path can be described as follows. The labels of the edges are the matching terms from above. Fitzgerald (2010) . In order to infer models from such ontologies and reason about their elements, semantic reasoners, as described by Glimm et al. (2014) ; Sirin et al. (2007) , are the method of choice to ensure an efficient and formal correct proceeding.
As previously pointed out, the quality of a model based analysis is directly dependent on the quality of the used model. The most prevalent and widespread modelling language in the field of computer science is the Unified Modeling Language (uml), which is, however, not designed for automated, machinebased security analysis. Specific modelling elements are provided as language extensions, like for security SecureUML by Lodderstedt et al. (2002) and UMLSec by Jürjens (2002) , or complete dialects such as SysML (which focusses on support of the specification, analysis, design, verification and validation of systems and systems-of-systems). While these model languages are effective during time of design, they lack methods to break down or expand single components and describe object relations. Detailed knowledge about the critical components, their parts, and relations is however crucial for the analysis. None of the methods allow an ontology-based completion process by using patterns of known elements, ontological knowledge, and a semantic reasoner.
The Cyber Security Modelling Language (CySeMol) by Sommestad et al. (2013) and its extension by Holm et al. (2015) combine UML-based information system modelling with Bayesian attack graphs to assess attack probabilities for a modelled system. The use of the relational model and the thereupon built inference engine allows the farreaching evaluation of 'what-if' scenarios. Networks consisting of well-known components can be evaluated efficiently due to the predefined granularity of the components. While this approach enables modifications of the model during analysis, it does not include iterative dissection, refinement or a way to model a lack of knowledge about the components of the system.
When searching for vulnerabilities of modules, it is essential to have links to their corresponding entries at vulnerability databases (like NIST NVD or Bugtraq). Promising connectors to such lists of cves are the cpe or the cwe. cpe is a standardised method of describing and identifying classes of applications, operating systems, and hardware devices present among an enterprise computing system. cwe is a list of software weaknesses that might result in a vulnerability of a product. These lists can be used in combination with previous investigations. The creation and linking of such databases to assign weaknesses, idiosyncrasies, faults and flaws (WIFFs), described by Martin et al. (2005) , enables various forms of automated security analysis and penetration reports like e.g. Knorr et al. (2011) .
Tools to perform an attack graph based security analysis are described by Ou et al. (2005) ; Lippmann et al. (2006); Noel et al. (2009); Jajodia et al. (2011) . It is typical for these approaches to separate the system model generation from the model analysis.
The input, which is required to create the model, is gathered by a network security scanner (like Nessus) and combined with some topology information in a predefined class model, especially information on how devices are interconnected. During the analysis of the model, vulnerability databases are searched for known vulnerabilities of the modelled modules while the initially created model itself remains unmodified.
To the best of our knowledge, all the works described above do not address incomplete or varying granularity of knowledge about the parts of the sue nor how to refine the initial model as part of the analysis. The created model is considered as a complete and correct basis for the entire analysis. Modifications are only used to evaluate effects of augmenting or removing modules. Our approach, in contrast, uses a reasoning engine not only to evaluate to, but also to refine and expand the model with ontological knowledge as well as predefined patterns.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, an modelling approach for machinebased security analysis using ontologies is presented. We propose a process of selective iterative model refinement, which allows different levels of detail for different parts of the system. For this, we provide an ontology language that allows us to formally describe the system and to infer implicit knowledge. We illustrate the applicability of the resulting model for security analysis by combining the model with vulnerability information. Our security analysis 72 reveals attack vectors resulting from paths through the system and from exploiting vulnerabilities.
The approach is very generic and further applications can be considered. For example, the analysis can be enriched by applying probability values to the vulnerability classes and using a probability analysis (like in Bayesian networks) to find the most relevant attack vectors. For large systems and more detailed analysis, more tool support is mandatory and under current development.
